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ABSTRACT
The U.S. military and others worldwide have undergone
a rapid evolution in the numbers, sophistication and lethality of
the robotic weaponry that they deploy to the battlefield. The rate
of transformation in the field of robotics and weapons
technology raises numerous questions about what legal
considerations hould be made as we approach the step beyond
remotely controlled drone weaponry to fully autonomous
fighting vehicles as human operated weapons evolve into self-
directed warriors.
This Article examines the interplay between the
obligation to produce legally compliant weapons and their
economic costs, and assesses how these costs may influence AFV
design. Based upon our analysis of this relationship we provide
recommendations to policymakers, including technical design
improvements, cost/compliance policy considerations,
modifications to increase command battlefield legal compliance
awareness, and increased policymaker awareness of AFVs' legal
compliance advantages.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, the U.S. Military had only 162 unmanned aerial
vehicles, commonly referred to as drones.1 By 2010, that
number exceeded 7,000, accounting for 41% of aircrafts in the
U.S. Air Force.2 As their numbers have increased, these
systems have become increasingly automated.3 Newly deployed
weapon systems have taken the first steps towards target
selection without input from human operators.4 The revolution
in robotics and weapons technology raises numerous questions
about the legality of deploying Autonomous Fighting Vehicles
(AFVs) onto the battlefield.
As human-operated weapons evolve into self-directed
warriors, the applicable legal framework expands beyond the
traditional determination of weapons' compliance with the
law,5 imposing additional positive and negative requirements.6
1 JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS 2 (2012).
2 As of 2010, the United States had 7,494 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles as
compared to 10,767 manned aircraft. Id. at 9.
3 In 2009 the Global Hawk automated spy plane used by the U.S. Air
Force was capable of taking off and landing by itself, and carrying out an
observation mission using GPS data without any pilot remotely guiding
it. Technology has significantly advanced since that time. RQ-4 Global
Hawk Maritime Demonstration System, NORTHRUPGRUMMAN.COM (Apr.
14, 2007), http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/RQ4Block
1OGlobalHawk/Docum ents/GHMD -New -Brochure.p df
[https://perma.cc/K6RT-YVVA].
4 South Korea Deploys Robots To Detect and Kill Intruders, TORONTO STAR
(July 14, 2010),http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2010/07/14/south
korea deploys robots to detect and kill intruders.html
[https://perma.cc/MF74-PBDT].
5 See W. Hays Parks, Means and Methods of Warfare, 38 GEO. WASH. INTL
L. REV. 511, 516 (2006) (discussing U.S. weapons review policy).
6 Positive requirements, for example, mandate effectiveness, accuracy, and
composition of weapons and ammunition. See, e.g., Convention on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or To Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523.
Negative requirements, on the other hand, ban classes and uses of
weapons. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Stockpiling, and U.se of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,
2
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The guiding principles for use and deployment (for example
proportionality, military necessity, and chivalry) remain the
same.
This paper examines the interplay between the obligation
to produce legally compliant weapons and the economic costs of
those weapons, and assesses how these costs may influence
AFV design. We begin by defining an autonomous weapon
system. We then examine obligations imposed by the Law of
Armed Conflict and Customary International Humanitarian
Law on AFVs. In particular, we evaluate how the Law of
Armed Conflict influences AFV design, construction, and
inventory maintenance. We conclude with recommendations for
executive and legislative policymakers, including technical
design improvements, cost and compliance policy
considerations, modifications to increase command battlefield
awareness of legal compliance, and increased policymaker
awareness of AFVs' legal compliance advantages.
I. Automation and True Autonomy in Weapon
Systems
The continuum from human control of the use of lethal
force to complete autonomy begins in automated weapon
systems. An automated weapon system is designed to
automatically engage a target when certain pre-determined
parameters are detected.7 Automated weapon systems have a
long history. The pit trap and its technological successors, the
land and sea mine, are examples of early automated weapons
systems.8 They are "victim activated." The target actuates the
weapon, but there is little or no ability to distinguish among
targets.
Newer weapon systems are advancing towards a dynamic
in which the weapon systems have a greater capacity to both
identify targets and choose not to activate against
inappropriate ones. For example, new anti-vehicle mines have
the capacity to distinguish between "friendly" vehicles and
Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800; cf. Evan Wallach, Pray Fire First Gentlemen
of France: Has 21st Century Chivalry Been Subsumed by Humanitarian
Law?, 3 HARv. NAT'L SEC. J. 431 (2012).
Alan Backstrom & Ian Henderson, New Capabilities in Warfare: An
Overview of Contemporary Technological Developments and the
Associated Legal and Engineering Issues in Article 36 Weapons Reviews,
94 INTL REV. OF THE RED CROSS, Summer 2012, at 488,
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2012/irrc-886-backstrom-
henderson.pdf [https://perma.ce/Y4ED-B9TG].
8 Kenneth Anderson, Daniel Reisner & Matthew C. Waxman, Adapting the
Law of Armed Conflict to Autonomous Weapon Systems, 90 INT'L L. STUD.
386, 388 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2477095
[https://perma.ce/3Y3P-PCLD].
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"enemy" vehicles based on whether they meet certain sensor
signatures.9 As technology has evolved, these systems have
gained greater range and ability to choose their own targets,
moving them into the realm of autonomous weapons.10
Lawful autonomous weapon systems are defined in our
analysis as weapons that have the capacity, without human
intervention, to identify, engage, and attack legitimate targets
without violating any law governing armed conflict. They may
or may not have the capacity to learn and adapt their
battlefield behavior without further human intervention or
programming.11 Some deployed weapon systems are capable of
defensive autonomous reactive targeting of perceived non-
human targets due to these systems' necessarily short reaction
9 Backstrom & Henderson, supra note 7, at 490. In addition, some systems
self-destruct after a limited period of deployment for tactical reasons and
as a safeguard against unintentional use against non-combatants. For
example, certain anti-vehicle mines developed by the United States self-
destruct after between 12 and 72 hours from deployment. See U.S. GOVT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-1003, MILITARY OPERATIONS:
INFORMATION ON THE U.S. USE OF LAND MINES IN THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
39 (2002) (noting that of the nearly 18 million land mines in the United
States stockpile in 2002, 15 million were equipped to self-destruct).




11 While predicting the exact nature and capacity of future autonomous
systems is outside the scope of this article, current computer research
strongly suggests that future systems will have the capacity to learn. The
Watson Computer provides one current example of a machine learning
process. See What Is Watson, IBM,
http://www.ibm.com/smarterplanet/us/en/ibmwatson/what-is-
watson.html [https://perma.cc/KN3F-H5NZ]. Computer learning could
present substantial and problematic issues, if, for example, a weapon had
the capacity to develop a preference for self-preservation over mission
completion and legal compliance.
4
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times.12 Indeed, potentially offensive autonomous targeting
decisions occur in some currently deployed weapons systems.
13
II. International Law Concerning the Legality of
Deploying Autonomous Weapon Systems
International law mandates that contracting nations
determine whether a developing weapon system is compliant
with the unvarying requirements of the laws of war.1 4 An
autonomous weapon system must observe the core principles of
the Law of Armed Conflict: distinction, military necessity,
12 Examples of defensive weapon systems selecting targets and firing
without human interference include the AEGIS anti-missile defense
system introduced into U.S. warships in the 1980s. The AEGIS system
had a mode in which it was able to fire without any human selection of
targets. The AEGIS Cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes's destruction of Iran Air
Flight 655, which resulted in 290 deaths, demonstrates the potential
flaws of such systems. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FORMAL INVESTIGATION INTO
THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE DOWNING OF IRAN AIR FLIGHT 655
ON 3 JULY 1988,
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/Reading Room/International Security Affai
rs/172.pdf [https://perma.cc/JKZ7-M3FY]. Similarly, the Counter Rocket,
Artillery, and Mortar (CRAM) system deployed in Iraq is designed to
identify and automatically shoot down incoming mortar shells without
any human command to fire. PETER W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR 124
(2009).
13 The Israeli Harpy and Harop Loitering Attack Systems are current
examples of offensive autonomous targeting. The Harpy consists of an
unmanned combat aerial vehicle which deploys over a battle space for an
extended period of time. The system includes an anti-radar homing
system, which allows the Harpy to attack any radar source that it detects
within a certain area. As a result, while the human commander will
designate the area in which the Harpy should patrol and target, the
actual decision to attack any one target is completely automated. Harop
Loitering Munitions UCAV System, Israel, AIRFORCE-TECHNOLOGY.COM,
http://www. airforce-technologycom/proj ects/haroploiteringmuniti
[https://perma.cc/3TZQ-W2GW]; see also Harpy Air Defense Suppression
System, DEFENSE-UPDATE. COM (Mar. 4, 2006), http:/defense-
update. com/directory/harpy.htm [https://perma. cc/JYB9-EHNB].
14 Article 36 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I states, "In the study,
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method
of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be
prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law
applicable to the High Contracting Party." Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]. While the United States is
not a party to Protocol I, in practice it observes Article 36 and effectively
treats it as a rule of customary international law. See Kenneth Anderson
& Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics for Autonomous Weapon
Systems: Why a Ban Won't Work and How the Laws of War Can (Stan.
U., The Hoover Inst., Jean Perkins Task Force on Nat'l Security and Law
Essay Series, 2013), at 10, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2250126
[https://perma.cc/72QV-PG2S].
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proportionality, chivalry, 15  and avoiding unnecessary
suffering.16 Given AFVs' capacity to operate independently and
lethally, their deployment and design also implicate laws
concerning command responsibility. This paper will primarily
focus on distinction and command responsibility.
17
A. The Principle of Discrimination and Its
Application to AFVs
A prime deployment issue is whether an autonomous
weapons system is capable of adequate target discrimination.
Combatants are required to observe the principle of
"distinction" (i.e. discrimination),18 which prohibits 1) the use of
15 As has been argued previously, an AFV may satisfy the necessary
principle of chivalry, which includes both positive requirements, such as
mercy, courage, trustworthiness, and loyalty, and negative prohibitions,
such as those banning treachery, perfidy, and breach of parole. See
Wallach, supra note 6.
16 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, The Law of Land Warfare 3, in FIELD
MANUAL 27-10, (July 1956); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, JOINT DOCTRINE
NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, 2011,
507 (arguing that an autonomous weapon system could be allowed to
make the decision to use lethal force "provided it could be shown that the
controlling system appropriately assessed the LOAC principles (military
necessity; humanity; distinction and proportionality) and that ROE
(Rules of Engagement) were satisfied, this would be entirely legal."); see
also GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 285 (2010) (stating that the principles of
distinction, military necessity, avoiding unnecessary suffering, and
proportionality are the core principles of the law of armed conflict); Evan
Wallach, Interactive Casebook of the Law of War: Chapter 2, General
Principles, INT'L L. OF WAR ASS'N (Dec. 8, 2010),
http://lawofwar.org/principles.htm (stating that the principles of avoiding
unnecessary suffering, military necessity, and proportionality are the
core principles of the law of armed conflict).
17 We will focus upon the issues relating to target discrimination and
command responsibility, rather than the remaining four core principles,
because target discrimination and command responsibility pose
challenges unique to AFV development which are not present in weapon
systems in which human control over target selection is maintained.
18 The principle of distinction is specifically enshrined in Article 48 of
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions which states, "[Tlhe
Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian
population and combatants." Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 48. The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) further defines the
principle of discrimination, by stating that "[t]he parties to the conflict
must at all time distinguish between civilians and combatants. Attacks
may only be directed against combatants. Attacks must not be directed
against civilians." 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at 11 (2005), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-
humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/KT7B-V85B]. While
Additional Protocol I has not been ratified by the United States, the
principle of distinction is well established in U.S. law. Article 22 of the
1863 Lieber Code states, "[A]s civilization has advanced during the last
6
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weapon systems that indiscriminately strike both lawful and
unlawful targets, and 2) the indiscriminant use of a weapon
regardless of its accuracy.19 A conventional weapon system
need only be designed in a way that places the burden on the
operator to employ it in a discriminatory manner. An
autonomous weapon system, on the other hand, must comply
with both facets since it selects and strikes a target.
Already there is a spectrum of responsibility between full
machine and full human responsibility for AFV target
selection. As autonomous weapons systems have become more
sophisticated, the extent to which a human or machine
exercises the principle of distinction has begun to shift. For
example, in traditional automated weapon systems such as
land mines, the principle of discrimination was exercised by the
military commander through the placement of mines in either
marked locations or locations where they were unlikely to be
triggered by civilians.20 In contrast, those deploying a system
such as the Harpy, which patrols a broad geographic area,
cannot rely on the absence of civilians from its targeting area
as a means of discrimination. To meet the distinction
requirement, a new autonomous weapon system must have an
effective means of distinguishing civilian from military targets.
Minimum technical requirements for distinction in any
autonomous system can be met only at a significant price,
potentially requiring sophisticated targeting sensors and the
software and computing power to fully and immediately
process the sensor data.
21
centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land,
the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms." FRANCIS
LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP'T, General Orders No. 100, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE
GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 22
(1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th century/lieber.asp
[https://perma.cc/SW4Q-MBVN]. The United States has also stated that
it recognizes that Article 48 of Protocol I is regarded as a codification of
the customary practice of nations and is therefore binding on all nations.
U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, APPENDIX 0, THE ROLE OF THE LAW OF WAR 614 (1992),
available at http://babel.hathitrust. org/cgi/pt?id=uiug. 30112004365182
;view=lup;seq=l [https://perma.cc/5GSA-XA7Z].
19 See Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of Discrimination in 21st Century
Warfare, 2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 143, 147-148 (1999).
20 Examples of this practice include the placement of mines on active
battlefronts or areas closed to civilians such as the Demilitarized Zone
between North and South Korea.
21 Even in the current non-autonomous generation of aircraft, sensors make
up an extensive portion of a vehicle's costs. Even at the low end of the
cost spectrum, the costs of the lightweight electro-optical/infrared
cameras on vehicles like the Desert Hawk and Dragon Eye UAV greatly
exceed the design costs of those vehicles. At the high end, the RQ-4B
Global Hawk's sensor suite accounts for 54% of the aircraft's overall cost.
7
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B. Command Responsibility and Its Application to
AFVs
Commanders bear responsibility for the actions of their
troops even when their troops act outside the commander's
orders.22 In 1947, in In re Yamashita, the United States
Supreme Court cited the Annex to the Hague Convention of
1907 for the principle that an armed force must be
"commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates" to be
accorded the rights of lawful belligerents.23 As part of these
responsibilities, a military commander has several important
duties, failure of which constitutes a war crime.24 Three aspects
of a commander's responsibility are particularly implicated by
autonomous weapon systems: the duty to train troops in the
laws of war, the duty to control troops, and the duty to monitor
and punish.
Commanders are responsible for ensuring that their troops
are trained in the Law of Armed Conflict. Under Geneva
Convention I of 1949 Article 47, contracting nations have an
obligation to include lessons on the Convention in their
military instruction.25 In the case of AFVs, the obligation to
properly train is effectively replaced by an obligation to
JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED
AERIAL SYSTEMS 15 (2012).
22 See Evan Wallach & I. Maxine Marcus, Command Responsibility, in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 459, 459-60 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 3d
ed. 2008); see also SOLIS, supra note 16, at 382 (citing an edict by Charles
VII of Orleans in 1439 stating that "each Captain and Lieutenant [will]
be held responsible for the abuses and offenses committed by members of
his company [and if] the offender thus escapes and evades punishment,
the [officer] will be deemed responsible for the offense as if he had
committed it himself .... ); Headquarters Dist. of the Border, U.S. Dep't
of Army, Gen. Order No. 10, § 5 (Aug. 18, 1863) ("Commanders of
companies and detachments serving in Missouri will not allow persons
not in the military service of the United States to accompany them on
duty except when employed as guides, and will be held responsible for
the good conduct of such men employed as guides and for their obedience
to orders."); Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, Annex, art. I, 36 Stat. 2277, 2295 (requiring that an army
be commanded by "a person responsible for his subordinates").
23 In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
24 See SOLIS, supra note 16, at 391-96.
25 "The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of
war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as
possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the
study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil
instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the
entire population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical
personnel and the chaplains." Geneva Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field art. 47, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31.
8
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properly program. AFVs differ significantly from regular
troops, however, in that a greater investment of resources in
programming and processing necessarily increases the AFVs
ability to implement the Law of Armed Conflict. Commanders
and their lawyers, of course, will require compliance training
more than ever.26
A commander also has a duty to control subordinates;
otherwise their crimes may be imputed.27 With human
combatants, the obligation is generally fulfilled through Rules
of Engagement.28 To satisfy this obligation, commanders need a
means to program (re-train) and disable a malfunctioning AFV.
These additional requirements further increase the cost of a
weapon system. To reprogram an AFV, a commander must, at
least in the foreseeable future, possess an ability to require
conduct specific to the area of operations. For the latter, the
AFV designer will not only need to incorporate something like
a "kill-switch," but also invest in security measures to prevent
activation of the switch by the enemy. An alternative approach
might require machines to periodically check in or return to
base. That, however, might require the purchase of a larger
number of AFVs than otherwise necessary.29
Finally, a commander is responsible for investigating Law
of Armed Conflict violations about which she is or should have
been aware.30 Under the "should have known standard" a
commander does not need to have specific knowledge that a
crime has been committed and can be held liable for ignoring
26 See Evan Wallach & Keith Zemsky, I'm Sorry Dave, I'm Afraid I Can't Do
That; Best Practices for Commanders of Fully Autonomous Fighting
Vehicles (on file with author).
27 In reYamashita, 327 U.S. at 15.
28 See U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, Legal Support to the Operational Army 7-1, in
FIELD MANUAL 1-04, (March 18, 2013); Evan Wallach, Interactive
Casebook of the Law of War: Chapter 4.3, Rules of Engagement, INTL L.
OF WAR ASS'N (Dec. 8, 2010), http://lawofwar.org/Decision /20Making.htm
[https://perma.cc/M85R-MUQK].
29 If an AFV is required to return to base more frequently, a larger number
of AFVs will be needed to maintain coverage within a combat zone.
Consider, for example, an AFV being used to blockade a port. If the AFV
is capable of remaining on station for years and patrolling indefinitely,
but it must return back to base periodically for check-ins, another AFV
will be required to replace the first one while it is in transit to and from
its home port. This challenge is similarly demonstrated through the
phenomenon of "blinking" in which video coverage of a target by drone is
lost due to necessary movement without a replacement drone available.
Quinta Jurecic, What the Intercept Found in "The Drone Papers" And
What I Found in Them, LAWFARE (Oct. 16, 2015, 5:20 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-intercept-found-drone-papers-and-
what-i-found-them [https://perma.cc/8VL4-PY3Q].
30 SOLIS, supra note 16, at 392.
9
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violations of the Law of Armed Conflict by his troops.
31
Therefore, any commander who deploys AFVs must have some
method of monitoring their actions and behavior to ensure that
they are not violating the Law of Armed Conflict, and a means
of verification should any general information arise suggesting
misconduct. Accordingly, AFV designers must include a
recording mechanism that is available for inspection. Current
United Kingdom military doctrine, for example, recognizes a
duty to include recording and information transmission
systems in AFVs that operate autonomously for an extended
period of time, so that commanders can monitor the AFVs'
activity.32
The governing principles described above are immutable.
The conflict we discuss here is how these principles fare in the
face of a range of economic realities governing states' conduct.
Indeed, even the richest state must be able to determine
whether, in light of its always eventually limited economic
resources, it must maintain certain numbers of weapons with
certain capacities, especially given the eventual obsolesce of
unused inventories.
III. Effect of Economic Costs on the Implementation
of Compliance Systems in AFVs
The economic capacity of the combatant state affects the
kinds of weapons systems it may deploy in a conflict. The
combatant state must: "take all feasible precautions in the
choice of means and methods of attack with a view of avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects."33 The word
31 "The 'had reason to know' standard does not require that actual
knowledge, either explicit or circumstantial, be established. Nor does it
require that the Chamber be satisfied that the accused actually knew
that crimes had been committed or were about to be committed. It
merely requires that the Chamber be satisfied that the accused had
,some general information in his possession, which would put him on
notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates."' Prosecutor v.
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-A, Judgment, 28 (July 3, 2002).
32 JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11: THE UK APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS supra note 16, at 510. ("For long-endurance missions engaged
in complex scenarios, the authorized entity that holds legal responsibility
will be required to exercise some level of supervision throughout. If so,
this implies that any fielded system employing weapons will have to
maintain a 2-way data link between the aircraft and its controlling
authority. A complex weapon system is also likely to require an
authorisation and decisions log, to provide an audit trail for any
subsequent legal enquiry.").
33 Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 57 (emphasis added). While the United
States has not ratified Protocol I, it has since indicated which Articles
contain principles it supports and will seek to follow, and has stated that
10
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"feasible" is important; it applies different standards of conduct
to combatants, commensurate with their technical and
economic capacities.
34
The evolution of technology and practice in aerial
bombardment demonstrates how the definition of "feasible
precautions" can vary. As technology has advanced, the
availability of feasible measures for reducing civilian casualties
has increased. In 1972 during the Linebacker II B-52 bombing
of targets near Hanoi and Haiphong in Vietnam, "Strategic Air
Command B-52 radar navigators were briefed to return from
their missions without dropping their bombs unless they were
one hundred percent certain of their aiming point. All B-52
target maps contained the locations of schools, hospitals, and
prisoner of war camps, and briefers brought such sites to the
attention of a crew if its bomb run was in the proximity of any
such object."35 Those were the maximum feasible measures
it supports the principles contained within Article 57. In 1987 the
Deputy Legal Advisor for the United States Department of State,
Michael Matheson presented a prepared statement on which aspects of
Protocol I the United States considered customary International Law to
the American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law. In his presentation Mr. Matheson
indicated that it was the position of the United States that it supported
the principle that "all practicable precautions, taking into account
military and humanitarian considerations, be taken in the conduct of
military operations to minimize incidental death, injury, and damage to
civilians and civilian objects, and that effective advance warning be given
of attacks which may effect the civilian population, unless circumstances
do not permit .... These various principles are reflected in articles 57-
60." This statement by the United States and the ratification by 174
nations of Protocol I indicate that Article 57 is customary International
Law which would be binding on all combatants. Martin P. Dupuis et al.,
The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law
Conference on International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on
Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions; Session One: The United States Position on the
Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 415,
426-27 (1987).
34 The U.S. military may take an opposing viewpoint to this position.
According to Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, under the
current U.S. view with regards to discrimination, the same absolute
rules bind every combatant, not a relative standard related to
capabilities. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew C. Waxman, Law and Ethics
for Robot Soldiers, Columbia Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 12-313, at 8-9
(2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2046375 [https://perma.cc/9VSP-BZZZ].
Taken to its logical extreme, that position would require states with
limited resources to use suicide bombers in place of smart weapons, when
targeting areas where noncombatants might be harmed.
35 W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F. L. REV. 1, 154
(1990).
11
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available to heavy bombers in 1972.36 The evolution of precision
or smart bombs, which enable a combatant to more closely
target a specific military objective, and reduce the chance of
accidently hitting nearby civilians, has changed that
equation.3
7
The shift towards precision bombing is particularly
noticeable in the case of the U.S. military. In the first Gulf War
in 1991, 7% of the bombs used were precision-guided
weapons.38 In the second invasion of Iraq in 2003, 70% of the
bombs and missiles were precision-guided.3 9 However, precision
bombing technology has spread unevenly and wealthy states
maintain a substantial technical lead over less developed
nations. One could envision conflicts where one combatant is
required to take more significant efforts to avoid civilian
casualties than the other because of its superior capacity to do
so.
The Syrian Civil War provides a current example of this
mismatch. In the September 21, 2014 strikes by U.S. forces
against Islamic State forces, 96% of the weapons used were
precision-guided.40 The Syrian Air Force lacks precision-guided
weapons, instead using a mix of conventional dumb bombs and
"barrel bombs" (oil barrels filled with explosives dropped off the
side of helicopters).41 Given this technical capacity, it would be
beyond the Syrian Air Force's feasibility requirements to use
precision weapons in its attacks.42 Article 57, however, still
36 Television-guided bombs did exist in 1972 but their use was restricted to
highly trained teams of light bombers. Examples include the AGM-62
Walleye II, which was also deployed during the Linebacker bombing
campaign. AGM-62 Walleye I, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG (July 7, 2011),
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/agm-62.htm
[https://perma.cc/Y7N9-NRG4].
31 An examination of some of the new and evolving capacities of precision
guided munitions can be found in J.R. Wilson, The Future of Precision




38 Sean J.A. Edwards, Swarming and the Future of Warfare 280 (2005)




40 Mark Thompson, These are the Weapons the U.S. is Using to Attack ISIS,
TIME, Sept. 23, 2014, http://time.com/3422702/isil-isis-syria-obama
[https://perma.cc/8FG5-ZAV4].
41 Richard M. Lloyd, Syria's Barrel Bomb Technology Relative to Aleppo
Syria Attacks The Good, The Bad And The Ugly, BROWN MOSES BLOG
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/syrias-barrel-
bomb-technology-relative.html [https://perma.cc/KWU2-5G9T].
42 The principles governing the use of force are, of course, consistent; their
application varies with capacity.
12
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requires the Syrian Air Force to take measures within its
capacity to protect noncombatants, including not targeting
civilian areas, and to apply the principles of military necessity
and proportionality-requirements the Syrian Air Force
appears to have consistently violated.
43
A. An Approach for Evaluating the Feasibility of
Measures to Avoid Civilian Casualties
There is no minimum technical specification that an AFV
must possess to be fully compliant with the Law of Armed
Conflict.44 Instead, under Article 57 one must examine whether
it is feasible for a combatant to improve the mechanisms and
procedures for avoiding civilian casualties. In examining that
requirement under Article 57(a), one cannot limit analysis to
mere technical feasibility. While determining whether to use a
weapon system or add a particular safety feature, one should
consider its effectiveness along three different axes: 1) the
military effectiveness of the weapon, 2) the cost of the weapon,
and 3) the danger of civilian casualties from use of the
weapon.
45
The easiest case to evaluate is a commander faced with
the choice between two weapon systems, system A and system
B, of equal cost and military effectiveness. If the use of system
A would cause more civilian casualties than system B, system
A would clearly fail the feasibility test. In this scenario, it
would be equally feasible to field a weapon that posed less risk
43 These measures include, inter alia, not targeting non-military areas,
dropping leaflets to warn the civilian population to depart areas of
anticipated conflict, developing highly detailed targeting maps, and
requiring bomber crews to take measures to increase accuracy. See C.J.
Chivers, Syria Unleashes Cluster Bombs on Town, Punishing Civilians,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/21/world
/middleeast/syria-uses -cluster-bombs-to-attack-as -many-civilians-as-
possible.html [https://perma.cc/39AG-E44H]; Parks, supra note 35, at
165-166.
44 As is shown regarding aerial bombardment, supra Part IV, the technical
specifications of an AFV vary depending on the technical and economic
capacity of the deploying country, and can vary over time in the same
country as technology advances.
45 In determining the feasibility of deploying a particular weapon system or
weapon system safety feature, we have chosen to use cost as an axis of
evaluation over technical capacity due to the way in which cost is able to
account for additional variables affecting a combatant's ability to acquire
or produce a weapon system. These factors include issues such as arms
embargoes, lack of access to necessary raw materials, and price gouging
by suppliers. See, e.g., Eric B. Golson, Did Swedish ball bearings keep the
Second World War going? Re-evaluating neutral Sweden's role, 60
SCANDINAVIAN ECON. HIST. REV. 165 (2012) (discussing the essential role
that Swedish ball bearings played in German arms manufacturing and
the damage to production caused by blockades of that supply).
13
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to the civilian population.46 Furthermore, beyond failing the
feasibility test outlined in Article 57, the choice to deploy
system A would also be against the spirit of two other closely
related principles of the Law of Armed Conflict: proportionality
and the ban on the employment of weapons that cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.47 While neither
principle is directly relevant, both demonstrate a clear and
unmistakable intent to ban weapons that increase human
suffering without providing an additional military advantage.
Efforts to reduce civilian casualties may hinder a state's
ability to effectively deploy the weapon system, either by
reducing the weapons system's military effectiveness or by
prohibitively increasing its cost. In the remainder of this paper,
we will focus on how combatants should evaluate these
tradeoffs, focusing on the tradeoff between the cost of an
autonomous weapon system and the potential civilian
casualties from its deployment.
B. Choosing Proper Frames of Evaluation and Their
Effects on Cost Feasibility Estimates
The economic feasibility of adding a feature to a weapon
system to reduce civilian casualties can vary greatly depending
on the reference frame. The two primary frames available are
the "weapon system level" and the "overall budget level."48 The
former model evaluates, at the level of each weapon system,
whether adding safety features will result in a weapon system
46 See Article 57 of Protocol I, supra note 14.
47 The use of a weapon system that inflicts greater civilian casualties and
would provide no additional advantage to the user militarily when
another system is readily available also contravenes one of the primary
motivating doctrines in arms control. The first modern arms control
treaty, The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, stated that nations are
prohibited from "the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable." While this
rule has always been directed at the prohibition of weapons which cause
unnecessary suffering amongst their targets (such as expanding bullets,
barbed lances, poison, etc.), it also puts forward a strong principle: that it
is not permissible to employ weapons with no military advantage over
alternatives that would decrease human suffering. Declaration
Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration), Dec. 11, 1868,
138 Consol. T.S. 297 (1868-69).
48 We have chosen to avoid an evaluation of cost on a "per weapon basis"
because such an analysis fails to account for quantity versus quality
tradeoffs. This is a particular problem in the area of AFVs, where
militaries may be choosing between using a single, highly advanced AFV
to penetrate an enemy's defenses, or a swarm of disposable AFVs to
overwhelm them. Evaluating these systems at the level of individual
units risks ignoring the military maxim, "Quantity has a quality all its
own.
14
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too expensive for deployment. In contrast, a budgetary model
calculates how much a country could feasibly spend on its
military.
1. An Evaluation of the Budgetary Model Analysis
The easiest way to construct a budgetary model would be to
calculate how much a country could feasibly spend on its
military based on a percentage of its gross domestic product
(GDP).49 After arriving at this number for a country, one would
then subtract the amount that it is currently spending on its
military (Feasible Military Spending - Current Military
Spending = X). If the cost of a safety feature is less than X,
then it is feasible for that country to purchase it.
The problem with a budgetary model frame is that it
produces skewed results. The countries most affected would be
those with low expenditures on their militaries relative to their
GDP, likely due to a lack of serious military threats.50 As a
result, the countries predicted to make the most additional
expenditures relative to their economies would be the ones
least likely to create civilian casualties, since they are unlikely
to take part in any military actions. It also has the perverse
effect of causing those countries to drive up military spending
to the required level, when they may prefer to use those funds
for health and safety purposes. Thus, the budgetary model
might cost more lives than it saves.51
49 One method could be to find the median percentage of GDP spent on
military expenditures and set that as the required amount. In 2013, this
was 2.3%. Military Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS. MIL.XPND. GD. ZS
[https://perma.cc/BJF5-V35P]. Other possible methods include looking at
the regional median or even the national historical median in order to
determine the proper level of spending. Finally, national practice, as
incorporated in international agreements, could be used as a guide. For
example, NATO's requirement that member states spend at least two
percent of their GDP on defense). See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, Funding NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq
/topics 67655.htm [https://perma.cc/7PZG-H3WM].
50 Military Expenditure, supra note 49.
51 To illustrate this point, consider the following hypothetical about
Canada. It spent one percent of its GDP of $1.827 trillion U.S.D. in 2013
on military expenditures. Data: Canada, WORLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/canada [https://perma.cc/VMQ5-
2PWR]. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the median
military spending, 2.3% of GDP in 2013 according to the World Bank, is
the benchmark of feasibility. Military Expenditure, supra note 49. In that
case, the feasibility requirements would require Canada to raise its
military expenditures by 130%, or by 23.75 billion dollars. If Canada
stays within its current budget of 276.3 billion, this would require
massive cuts to many social programs and likely result in more total
deaths than those saved by the expenditures on weapon safety measures.
In comparison, the Canadian Federal Government transfers 44.2 billion
15
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2. Evaluation of the Cost-Per-Life-Saved Analysis
As a result of these distortions, we propose that any
evaluations of feasibility under the Law of Armed Conflict
standards be conducted at the weapons system level using the
"Cost-Per-Life-Saved" model. A Cost-Per-Life-Saved model
takes the cost of the safety feature and divides it by the
estimated number of lives saved. To understand the Cost-Per-
Life-Saved model, consider the following hypothetical. A
country is planning to purchase 1,000 drones for ten billion
dollars. These drones come with one of two different sensor
systems. Sensor System A has a superior ability to distinguish
between civilians and combatants; it is estimated that using
Sensor System A will result in 100 less civilian casualties over
the lifetime of the drone fleet. However, a fleet utilizing Sensor
System A will cost an additional three billion dollars.
In the drone fleet hypothetical, Sensor System A has a cost
per life of 30 million dollars (3 billion dollars divided by 100
lives equals 30 million dollars). The problem is determining
whether this cost per life is unfeasibly excessive.
The primary advantage of the Cost-Per-Life-Saved Model is
that a working system already exists with a methodology for
determining when the cost per life is excessive. In the United
States, federal agencies such as the Department of
Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency
regularly make Cost-Per-Life-Saved calculations to determine
whether or not to impose regulations to mandate certain safety
features.52  For example, in 2005, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) considered a proposal to require car
companies to double the strength of car roofs in order to reduce
deaths in rollover accidents.53 The DOT estimated that this
change would save 135 lives and prevent 1,065 nonfatal
injuries per year.54 However, based upon its calculations, this
would cost between 376 and 824 million dollars more than the
dollars to other levels of government to support the public Health
System. Jordan Press, The 2014 Federal Budget by the Numbers: The
Nitty Gritty of this Year's Budget, CANADA.COM (Feb. 11, 2014),
http://o.canada.com/news/national/the-2014-federal-budget-by-the-
numbers [https://perma.cc/MF3Y-GEB7].
52 As part of the economic analysis required by Executive Order 12866,
federal agencies are required to place a monetary value on the expected
health benefits of health, safety, and environmental regulations which
are designed to reduce the risk of injury. CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R41140, How AGENCIES MONETIZE "STATISTICAL LIVES"
EXPECTED TO BE SAVED BY REGULATIONS (2010).
53 Id. at 20. The DOT has a conversion factor that values each nonfatal
injury as the equivalent of 5.2% of a fatality, meaning that the regulation
would prevent 190 fatality equivalents.
54 Id.
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value of the lives saved per year.55 Consequently, the DOT
chose a less stringent regulation.56 These calculations are
typically made by agencies engaging in a cost-benefit analysis
of a new policy or regulation that may affect public health
across a wide population. In fact, the Environmental Protection
Agency has used these methods since the 1980s.57 Regulators
in other countries employ similar calculations.58
When these entities attempt to balance the costs and
benefits of a particular policy, they use the "value of the
statistical life," or VSL, to determine whether a policy is
appropriate or too burdensome to implement.59 The VSL is
calculated using surveys and data that measure an individual's
willingness to accept marginal levels of increased risk of death
in exchange for a monetary advantage.60 Economists have
focused on specific types of market decisions that involve these
implicit trade-offs to develop estimates of the value of a
statistical life. 61 While there are several techniques for arriving
at the value of a statistical life, the primary method is
measuring an individual's willingness to pay to reduce a small
risk of dying.62 Economists rely upon measurements of
differential compensation for on-the-job risk in labor markets,
for example, as a proxy for how much an employee needs to be
paid to accept a slightly riskier job. 63
Importantly, because the value of a statistical life is
measured using data from the labor market of a specific
55 Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance; Phase-
In Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348 (May 12, 2009).
56 Id.
51 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY: NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS ON MORTALITY RISK VALUATION (2015),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/MortalityRiskValuation.htm
1 [https://perma.cc/QFFG-WSZM].
58 See Vincent Biausque, The Value of Statistical Life: A Meta-Analysis
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Working





60 For a detailed mathematical analysis of the calculations made to derive
the value of a statistical human life from labor market data, see W. Kip
Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical
Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World 4-7 (Harvard Law
School John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion
Paper Series, Paper 392) (2002), http://lsr.nellco.org/harvard olin/392
[https://perma.cc/R9GP-P5QJ].
61 Id. at 1-2.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 4-7.
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country, the VSL varies between nations.64 This range of
outcomes raises the question of which VSL a combatant ought
to use when considering a weapon system.
65
3. Civilian Lives Should Be Valued Based Upon the
VSL of the Citizens of the Country Deploying the
Weapon
We propose that in any calculations involving a trade-off
between civilian lives and cost of a safety feature, a combatant
should be required to use the VSL of its own citizens. This rule
is predictable and tracks closely with the feasibility
requirement of Additional Protocols Article 57.2(a). First,
requiring a nation to use its own citizens' lives as a
measurement of value avoids neocolonial discounting of the
lives of civilians in the targeted area, which would allow less
care when targeting citizens of poorer nations.66 That concept
facially violates the U.N. Charter and numerous human rights
treaties.67 Second, VSL closely tracks the overall wealth of a
64 Biausque, supra note 58, at 14.
65 It should be noted that this analysis only involves targeting under
certain weapon systems and does not abrogate responsibility under
applicable general principles.
66 For example, Biausque cites a study conducted in 2006 pegging the
average value of a statistical life in Bangladesh at 5,248 U.S. dollars;
while in 2010, the EPA set the value of the statistical human life at 9.1
million dollars. As a result, a country would need to spend 1733 times
more to preserve a human life while operating in the U.S. than when
operating in Bangladesh. Biausque, supra note 58, at 14; Binyamin
Appelbaum, As U.S. Agencies Put More Value on a Life, Businesses Fret,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/business
/economy/ 1 7regulation.html [https://perma.cc/G9QR-JQC9].
67 The United Nations Charter specifically establishes the principle of
"equal rights and self-determination of peoples." U.N. Charter, art. I, 2.
Furthermore, several key International Humanitarian treaties specify
that certain rights cannot be restricted based on an individual's national
or social origin, or property. See The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. II, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; The
International Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art.
II, Dec. 16 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3. Additionally, the crime against
humanity of prosecution focuses on selective punitive acts that
discriminate along racial religious or political lines. See Prosecutor v.
Naletilic and Martinovic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgement 634 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/naletilicmartinovic/tjug/en/nal-tj030331-
e.pdf [https://perma.ce/DU64-6LNS] ("The following elements must be
proven to establish that persecution as a crime against humanity has
been committed: (i) The perpetrator commits a discriminatory act or
omission; (ii) The act or omission denies or infringes upon a fundamental
right laid down in international customary or treaty law; (iii) The
perpetrator carries out the act or omission with the intent to
discriminate on racial, religious or political grounds; (iv) The general
requirements for a crime against humanity pursuant to Article 5 of the
Statute are met."); see also Prosecutor v. Kupresic et al., Case No. IT-95-
18
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nation.68 As a result, countries with more wealth will be
required to spend more on avoiding civilian casualties than
poorer nations. Finally, there is a predictability benefit:
military planners can always be certain of the relevant VSL
calculation when developing a weapon system.
4. Feasibility Evaluations May Vary by Battlespace
and Commanders Are Not Responsible for
Incorrect, Good-Faith Evaluations of Feasibility
While a military cannot shift its valuation of human life
based on regional wealth, the location of hostilities may affect
an AFV's feasibility evaluation. For example, the concentration
of civilians may vary in unexpected battlespaces. If military
planners have developed an arsenal predicated on the belief
that they will need to face a very large enemy force in a region
with a minimal civilian population (e.g., Saudi Arabian
military planners anticipating an invasion from Iraq), then
their calculations will require far fewer safety measures than if
they were fighting an enemy in urban areas.69 However,
because of the lag between the start of a conflict and the re-
equipping of armed forces, a military could unexpectedly be
forced to deploy weapons in a region where deployment would
not have been considered legal prior to the conflict.
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld famously
stated, "You go to war with the army you have, not the army
you might want or wish to have at a later time."70 The trial of
Generaloberst Lothar Rendulic demonstrates that the "fog of
war" can serve as a legitimate defense against charges of war
crimes.7 1 Military planners cannot always predict the location
16-T, Judgement 615 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan.
14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-
tj000114e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GGJ-C57P] ("Persecution can also
involve a variety of other discriminatory acts, involving attacks on
political, social, and economic rights.").
68 Biausque, supra note 58, at 14.
69 As civilian density decreases, the probability of hitting a civilian with an
errant shot decreases. Thus, under the Cost-Per-Life-Saved Model, a
weapon system upgrade that improves accuracy would be justified in a
densely populated setting where it could save 100 lives, but it would not
be in a scarcely populated setting, where it would only save 10 lives.
70 Troops Put Rumsfeld in the Hot Seat, CNN (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://www.cnn.com/2004[US/12/08/rumsfeld.kuwait/index.html
[https://perma.cc/XV8A-WSGF].
71 In 1944 Rendulic was the German Armed Forces Commander North,
which included Nazi forces in Norway. Following the retreat of three
Army Corps from Finland with Soviet troops in hot pursuit, Rendulic
ordered the implementation of a scorched-earth policy in the province of
Finmark, including the forcible evacuation of the civilian inhabitants,
the destruction of roads and bridges, communication lines, port facilities,
and civilian housing. He was charged with the destruction and seizure of
19
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and nature of future armed conflict; their choices in equipping
their military forces must be judged on the basis of whether
they "acted within the limits of honest judgment on the basis of
conditions prevailing at the time."72 Liability, however, could
emerge if commanders fail to take reasonable steps to re-
configure their arsenals and supply chain once the nature of
the conflict becomes apparent.
73
IV. Effect of the Economic Costs of Compliance
Systems on the Design of AFVs
These feasibility and economic concerns affect the strategic
choices made in the design of AFVs. Costs can be fixed across
the entire weapon system or there can be incremental costs
that increase in each unit produced, thereby creating different
pressures on designers.
A. Role of Individual Vehicle Costs on the Design of
AFVs
One of the key programming calculations is the balance
between the AFV's survival and avoidance of civilian
casualties, particularly where the threat to the AFV is
ambiguous.
Consider two possible AFVs. One is a $100,000 sentry unit
guarding a checkpoint, and the second is a $100,000,000
advanced AFV located at an identical checkpoint. Each unit is
approached by a civilian vehicle that does not respond to
instructions and which may contain a bomb. The longer the
AFV gives the civilian vehicle to respond to its instructions, the
more likely it is that a bomb will succeed in destroying the
AFV. Because no soldiers are present to be killed by a blast,
there is no human self-defense justification for shooting the
enemy property in violation of The Hague Regulations Article 23(g),
which prohibits "the destruction or seizure of enemy property except in
cases where this destruction or seizure is urgently required by the
necessities of war." Rendulic justified his actions on the grounds that
these measures were justified by the military necessity of protecting his
retreating forces from Soviet troops. At the time of trial, it was clear that
"there is evidence on record that there was no military necessity for this
destruction and devastation," as the Soviets had halted their advance.
However, the court acquitted Rendulic of the charge on the grounds that
"the conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time were
sufficient upon which he could honestly conclude that urgent military
necessity warranted the decision made." U.S. v. Wilhelm List ("The
Hostage Case") XI TWC 1113 (1948).
72 Id.
73 For example, the use of weapons which may be justified at the start of a
conflict may not be justified several years into a conflict because
sufficient time has passed for the military to feasibly deploy more
compliant weapon systems.
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 18 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol18/iss1/1
2016 Fielding Fighting Vehicles Compliant with the 21
Laws of Armed Conflict
vehicle. Instead, the determination to fire must be justified
under the military necessity to protect friendly lives and
combat resources. The cost and ability to replace the AFV will
dictate the level of leniency granted to the driver of the
approaching vehicle. As such, under these hypothetical
circumstances and assuming equal vulnerability ranges, the
$100,000,000 AFV must be programmed to open fire sooner
than the $100,000 unit.
Allowing more valuable AFVs more leeway in opening fire
on potential threats can be justified under the principles of
proportionality, which holds that "loss of life and damage to
property must not be out of proportion to the military
advantage to be gained, and of military necessity which
permits only that use of force required to achieve a legitimate
military goal."74 Here, the military advantage and necessity is
the preservation of the AFV for combat operations. Since the
loss of the more expensive AFV depletes more national military
resources, these principles permit the use of more robust
measures to preserve it.
75
Under the feasibility standard, combatants might prefer
disposable AFVs given their greater leeway in circumstances
involving civilians. In contrast, however, economic costs and
other tactical and strategic considerations support more
centralized and expensive AFVs. Assuming a non-swarming
system,76 each individual AFV will require a sensor system and
a computer capable of processing the sensor's input and
making decisions based on that input. A combatant who spends
a similar percentage of a unit's procurement budget on sensors
and computing systems in both small procurements of
expensive AFVs and mass procurements of more disposable
units will be able to afford more advanced sensor and
computing systems in the lower-production-run unit.77
14 U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 16, at 19.
15 Although the deploying power may be under some concomitant obligation
not to unnecessarily expose the high-value AFV for inconsequential
purposes.
716 Swarm Robotics can be defined as "the study of robotic systems
consisting of large groups of relatively small and simple robots that
interact and cooperate with each other in order to jointly solve tasks that
are outside their own individual capabilities." Frederick Ducatelle et al.,
Self-organized Cooperation Between Robotic Swarms, 5 SWARM
INTELLIGENCE 73, 74 (2011). By virtue of communication between
members of the swarm, the swarm is able to perform calculations and
feats of which individual members are not capable, meaning that it is not
necessary for each individual component of the swarm to have highly
advanced processing systems or sensors. Id.
77 For instance, consider two separate procurements of ten billion dollars
each. The first procurement is for five Autonomous Naval Destroyers at
two billion dollars each. The second procurement is for one thousand
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The military procurer's task is uneasy. While recent U.S.
experience favors a qualitative edge in conventional war,
78
other conventional examples79 and unconventional warfare
scenarios80 demonstrate the value of quantitative superiority.
In particular, numerosity is valuable where the battlespace
requires extensive deployments of small units over a wide
geography to defend the populace and deny opponents access to
resources.
B. Role of System-Wide Costs in Effecting AFV
Design
In contrast to sensors and computing power, software and
research and development are fixed costs for a weapon system,
regardless of the number of units created. Based upon the
current costs for drone vehicles, one can anticipate that the
general cost of research and development will account for
approximately 20% of the total weapon system procurement
cost.81 The research and development costs per system can be
lowered significantly by allocating them across multiple
weapon systems rather than creating a unique platform for
each system.
The U.S. military is currently considering this model. In
2012, the Defense Science Board recommended separating the
procurement of autonomous systems from the acquisition of
vehicle platforms. This separation would allow for the
autonomous swarming naval escort vehicles at ten million dollars each.
If 20% of the budget is designated for sensors and computing resources,
then the budget for those systems will be two million dollars in each of
the small boats in comparison with four hundred million in the case of
each destroyer.
78 See ANNIE JACOBSEN, THE PENTAGON'S BRAIN: : AN UNCENSORED HISTORY
OF DARPA, AMERICA'S TOP-SECRET MILITARY RESEARCH AGENCY 27 (2015).
19 World War Two is an example, where U.S. production of transport ships,
bombers, and tanks simply overwhelmed any German qualitative edge.
JOHN ELLIS, BRUTE FORCE, ALLIED STRATEGY AND TACTICS IN THE SECOND
WORLD WAR 18, 266 (1990).
80 See Vietnam and post-2003 Iraq for examples. See JACOBSEN, supra note
78, at 133-34.
81 This percentage was arrived at using figures from the U.S Government
Accountability Office disclosing the total procurement costs and research
and development costs of a range of weapon systems. The authors
calculated the total funding to complete procurement of all vehicles listed
as unmanned and then divided this by the total research and
development costs of those units. These units included: MQ-IC Grey
Eagle, MQ-4C Triton, MW-8 Fire Scout, MQ-9 Reaper, RQ-4 A/B Global
Hawk. Note that these figures do not include weapons systems still
under the "black budget" and not fully disclosed to the public, which may
have a different balance of research and development versus
procurement costs. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-140340SP,
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS
(2014).
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deployment of a single version of autonomy software across
platforms, rather than requiring a new artificial intelligence
(AI) for each.
82
In 2008, the U.S. government was responsible for 80% of
research funding into artificial intelligence in the United
States.83 There is evidence that this dynamic is changing
rapidly as more corporations understand the commercial
possibilities of drones and autonomous vehicles.84 Off-the-shelf
82 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE ROLE OF AUTONOMY IN DoD
SYSTEMS 12 (2012), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb
/autonomy.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8UV-AQLE].
83 SINGER, supra note 12, at 78.
84 An excellent example of this shift has occurred in the research and
development of self-driving cars. The Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency helped to kick-start the field through a series of three "Grand
Challenges." In these challenges outside teams competed to complete an
increasingly difficult set of courses with autonomous vehicles in order to
win cash prizes. These challenges took places in 2004, 2005, and 2007
and witnessed an extraordinary growth in the capabilities of the cars. In
the initial 2004 contest no car managed to go more than seven miles of
the planned 142 mile course in a empty desert environment. By the final
race, teams had managed to complete a 132 mile course as well as
navigate a complex course in a city environment while negotiating other
moving traffic and obeying traffic regulations. The DARPA Grand
Challenge: Ten Years Later, DARPA (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2014-03-13 [https://perma.cc/RFP4-
YQUD]. This in turn triggered a wave of commercial research in the
area. See, e.g., What We're Driving At, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 9,
2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/what-were-driving-at.html
[https://perma.cc/B5WQ-9TLA] (announcing the Google self-driving car
research project and noting the DARPA Challenge pedigree of its
technical team members). While fully autonomous cars are not yet
commercially available, companies such as Tesla offer autopilot features
which increasingly automate driving tasks, including steering to stay
within a lane and managing speed based on surrounding traffic and
speed limits. See Dual Motor Model S and Autopilot, TESLA BLOG (Oct.
10, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/dual-motor-model-s-and-
autopilot [https://perma.cc/CA9Q-55P9]. In 2015, several major car
companies made dueling press announcements stating their intention to
produce fully self-driving cars for the commercial market in the next
several years. See, e.g., Alex Davies, I Rode 500 Miles in a Self Driving
Car and Saw the Future. It's Delightfully Dull, WIRED (Jan. 7, 2015),
http://www.wired. com/2015/01 /rode- 500-miles-self-driving-car-saw-
future-boring [https://perma.cc/7GP8-LRJ2] (Audi had reporters drive a
self-driving car model to the 2015 Consumer Electronics Show and stated
that the technology will be in production cars within 3-5 years.).
However, it should be noted that despite the fast pace of progress, a
significant wait exists before truly autonomous vehicles will be
commercially available. Bryant Walker Smith, A Legal Perspective on
Three Misconceptions in Vehicle Automation, in ROAD VEHICLE
AUTOMATION 85 (Gereon Meyer & Sven Beiker eds., 2014) ("Automotive
experts recognize that the path from research to product is long-and
that there is a tremendous difference between, on one hand, a research
system that well-trained technicians carefully maintain, update, and
operate exclusively on certain roads in certain conditions and, on the
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purchases, as in other government procurement areas, present
a cost-effective alternative.
8 5
In the purely Al space, companies are making significant
investments in artificial intelligence interfaces with their
systems. These include well-publicized projects such as the
Watson computer, created by IBM to win the television show
Jeopardy, which is now being used commercially to guide
decisions on drug regimens for cancer patients.8 6 As more
corporations fund research on autonomy in their efforts to
develop commercial products, military developers will be able
to supplement their own designs for more compliant AFV
autonomy systems87
Procurement experience demonstrates that government
costs decrease as technology is disseminated.88 The legal
implications of cheaper technology include: 1) an increased
obligation to incorporate Al into a broader spectrum of
weapons; 2) an obligation to maintain an expanded inventory of
smarter weapons; and, most importantly, 3) a shift in the
calculus of the requirements of weapons use. As Al-controlled
weapons become cheaper, smarter, and more ubiquitous, the
core principles of the Law of Armed Conflict will each militate
against "dumb" weapons in every environment.
V. Recommendations for Policymakers
In light of these economic pressures and legal obligations,
we have several recommendations for policymakers authorizing
the development of AFV systems.
First, we recommend the development of Al that is
compatible with multiple weapons systems. We also
recommend the development of less expensive AFVs (or
other hand, a production system that poorly trained consumers neglect
and abuse for two decades in almost any conceivable driving scenario.
For this reason, production vehicles take years to be developed, tested,
and certified to a complex array of highly detailed public and private
standards.").
85 AM. BAR ASS'N, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW, THE DESKBOOK FOR
PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS, ch. 11 (3d ed. 2007); W. NOEL KEYES,
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION
(3d ed. 2003).
86 Bruce Upbin, IBM's Watson Gets Its First Piece of Business in
Healthcare, FORBES (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2013/02/08/ibms-watson-gets-its-
first-piece-of-business-in-healthcare [https://perma. cc/YR7H-APYE].
87 Similarly, cancer research may have a synergistic relationship with
nano-weaponry. See Evan J. Wallach, A Tiny Problem with Huge
Implications Nanotech Agents as Enablers or Substitutes for Banned
Chemical Weapons: Is a New Treaty Needed?, 33 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 858
(2009-2010).
88 See DESKBOOK FOR PROCUREMENT PROFESSIONALS, supra note 85.
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cheaper subunits deployable by expensive AFVs) for use in
those civilian interaction situations that require balancing the
survival of machines with survival of civilian noncombatants.
Second, when regulating the development and deployment
of AFVs, policymakers ought to avoid being bound by initial
analyses that a fixed amount of money per safety feature is
sufficient, and instead focus on the VSL of the country fielding
the weapon system.
Third, we recommend the development of a military
command structure that provides commanders with
comprehensive logs of AFV battlefield activity. While some
AFVs have the capacity to record battlefield activities, this
alone is insufficient. Commanders need to access the logs in
their entirety to effectively monitor subordinates.
Finally, we urge policymakers to recognize that AFVs, if
made compliant with the Law of Armed Conflict, possess
inherent advantages that promote more "humane" approaches
to war. Although there has been widespread criticism of "killer
robots," robots are not subject to the same limitations as their
human counterparts. A robot soldier will not avenge its ally's
death and is more likely to risk its own safety to avoid
inflicting civilian casualties. Properly developed AFVs have the
capacity to create a more compliant and principled battlefield
environment.
CONCLUSION
Autonomous fighting vehicles can already select their own
targets and are gradually replacing the human soldier. Their
deployment has revolutionized military affairs. Encouragingly,
AFVs may eventually mitigate civilian collateral damage due
to superior reaction times and dispassionate reactions in
combat.
The extent to which an AFV is able to comply with the
Laws of War and avoid civilian casualties will largely depend
on design decisions that significantly impact the economic cost
of deploying that vehicle. By evaluating AFV systems using a
cost-per-death calculation based on the value of a statistical life
of the deploying nation, combatants can effectively determine
whether their weapon systems are compliant with the laws of
war and commanders can fulfill their responsibilities. With
new capabilities come new responsibilities. Balancing these
factors will become increasingly important as the economic
costs of replacing destroyed AFVs replaces the avoidance of
casualties as a driver of rules of engagement.
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